CAA records: deciding which certificate authorities may issue for your domain
Any of the many trusted certificate authorities (CAs) can, in principle, issue a TLS certificate for your domain, as long as the person asking passes that CA's domain validation. Most companies use 1 or 2 CAs, yet they leave the choice open to all of them.
A CAA record (Certification Authority Authorization) closes that gap. It is a DNS record in which you list the CAs that are allowed to issue certificates for your domain. Before issuing, every publicly trusted CA must look the record up and refuse if it is not on the list.
The short answer: CAA is a simple, low risk control that narrows who can issue certificates in your name. It does not replace good account security or certificate monitoring, but it removes a whole class of surprises, and it is worth having on every business domain.
What CAA is and why CAs must respect it
CAA is defined in RFC 8659 (November 2019), which replaced the original RFC 6844. In the words of the RFC, the record "allows a DNS domain name holder to specify the Certification Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain name."
What makes it effective is the rule set every public CA follows. The CA/Browser Forum made CAA checking mandatory with ballot 187, effective 8 September 2017. Under the current Baseline Requirements, a CA must process the issue, issuewild and iodef tags, must not issue when it meets an unknown tag marked as critical, and must issue within the TTL of the CAA record or 8 hours, whichever is greater.
Since 15 March 2026, the same requirements also say that CAs must perform DNSSEC validation on the lookups for CAA records. If your domain is signed (see DNSSEC for a business domain), a forged answer that tries to hide your CAA policy will not pass.
How a CA reads your CAA records
The lookup climbs the DNS tree. For a certificate on shop.example.com, the CA first asks for CAA records at shop.example.com. If there are none, it asks example.com, and so on up to, but not including, the root. The first set it finds is the one that applies.
That has 2 practical consequences:
- 1 set of records at
example.comcovers every subdomain that has no CAA records of its own. - A subdomain can have its own, different policy, for example when a marketing platform issues certificates for
go.example.comthrough another CA.
If no CAA records exist anywhere on the way up, CAA places no restriction and any CA may issue. The same is true when the set contains only iodef entries, as section 3 of RFC 8659 explains.
The 3 tags you need: issue, issuewild and iodef
A CAA record has 3 parts: a flag (normally 0), a tag and a value. A typical policy looks like this:
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issue "ca2.example.net"
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issuewild ";"
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@example.com"
- issue lists a CA that may issue ordinary certificates. Each CA publishes the exact value to use; for Let's Encrypt it is
letsencrypt.org, as stated in its CAA documentation. Add 1 line per CA. - issuewild applies only to wildcard certificates such as
*.example.com, and when present it takes precedence overissuefor them (section 4.3). The value";"means no CA may issue a wildcard. If you do not use wildcards, this line removes a broad certificate from the picture entirely. - iodef gives an address where a CA can report a request it refused because of your policy. The Baseline Requirements say CAs should send such reports, not that they must, so treat it as a useful extra signal rather than an alarm.
To block issuance completely, for a domain that should never have a certificate, publish 0 issue ";".
RFC 8657 adds 2 optional parameters, accounturi and validationmethods, which tie issuance to 1 specific CA account or validation method. The Baseline Requirements make processing them mandatory for CAs from 15 March 2027. They are worth considering once your basic policy is stable.
How to check your domain
You can see your current policy with dig:
dig +short CAA example.com
dig +short CAA www.example.com
No output for both means there is no policy, and every trusted CA may issue. If you get records, compare them with the CAs you actually use. A quick way to find those is to search the Certificate Transparency logs for your domain, as described in Certificate Transparency logs explained. Every CA that issued for you in the last year should either be in your CAA list or be one you have stopped using on purpose.
Also check the subdomains that are aliases. If shop.example.com is a CNAME to a hosting platform, the lookup follows the alias, and the platform's own CAA records can decide what applies.
Rolling it out without breaking renewals
Most CAA problems are self inflicted: a certificate that fails to renew because the CA that renews it was left off the list. A calm order of steps avoids that:
- Inventory first. List every certificate in use on your domains, including those issued by your CDN, your email or marketing provider, your helpdesk tool and your hosting platform. Many of them issue certificates for you automatically.
- Write the policy with an
issueline for each of those CAs, anissuewildline, and aniodefaddress that someone reads. - Publish with a short TTL at first, so a mistake can be fixed quickly, then raise it.
- Watch the next renewals. If a provider reports a renewal error that mentions CAA, add its CA and retry.
- Update the policy whenever you change providers, as part of the same change.
A short checklist:
- CAA records present on every domain you own, including the ones that only redirect
- every CA in use is listed, nothing more
issuewild ";"unless you need wildcards- an
iodefaddress that reaches a person - DNSSEC enabled, so the policy cannot be forged in transit
What CAA does not do
CAA is a check performed by the CA before issuance. Section 5.3 of RFC 8659 is clear that it does not stop mis-issue by a CA you have authorized. It also does not help if someone gains access to your DNS account and edits the record itself, which is why changes to nameservers and DNS records deserve their own attention (see unexpected nameserver or registrar changes). And browsers do not read CAA when they connect: the RFC says relying parties must not use it to validate certificates.
Where Business Alerts fit
Business Alerts check your domains from the outside every day and need no access to your systems. A missing or incomplete CAA policy, and any new certificate issued in your name that you did not request, are among the checks in what we guard. When something changes, a specialist reviews it and you receive the exact DNS records to add or correct, as described in what happens when we find something. You can see how it looks in the example dashboard.
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